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NOTE
National Panasonic (UKX.) Ltd P.
Commission of the European
Communities: The Common Market's
First Look at Warrantless Searches
in Antitrust Investigations
National Panasonic (UK) Ltd v. Commission of the European
Communities' is the first decision of the European Court of Justice
2
delineating the powers of the European Commission (Commission)3 to
conduct evidentiary searches on the premises of firms suspected of vio-
lating the European Economic Community's antitrust laws.4 The
Court held that the Commission may conduct on-the-spot searches of
1 [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2033, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 169.
2 The Court of Justice of the European Communities is the ultimate reviewing body of deci-
sions rendered by the Commission. The Court has two principal types ofjurisdiction: 1) review
of formal decisions of the European Commission and 2) review of questions of Community law
on reference from the Member States' national courts. B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON
MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 412 (1979).
3 The Commission in Brussels serves as the administrative organ of the Common Market. It
consists of thirteen Commissioners, with two appointed by each of the four largest Member States.
In addition, the Commission has a sizeable administrative staff. See Graupner, Commission Deci-
sion-Mfaking on Competition Questions, 10 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 291 (1973), for a description of
the internal procedures of the Commission in applying general anticompetition policies.
4 The primary competition rules in the Common Market applicable to private firms are Arti-
cles 85 and 86 of the Rome Treaty. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community,
Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. I1 (entered in force Jan. 1, 1958 [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
Article 85 is similar to section 1 of the Sherman Act. Article 85(1) prohibits "all agreements
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and any concerted practices
which are likely to affect trade between the Member States and which have as their object or result
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market. ... Id at
art. 85(l). Article 86 prohibits abuse of an undertaking's "dominant position" within the Com-
mon Market. Id at art. 86.
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firms without prior notification.' The Court's decision greatly expands
the investigatory powers of the Commission at the expense of signifi-
cant privacy and due process rights for firms operating within the Euro-
pean Community. This note will examine the extent to which the
Court's decision departs from both the language and intent of the Com-
munity's statutory grant of investigatory powers to the Commission,
and will explore safeguards that the Community's legislative authori-
ties should introduce to protect a firm's rights while affording the Com-
mission maximum discrefionary power.
The Commission is empowered to enforce the European Commu-
nity's antitrust laws pursuant to Regulation 17.6 Articles 11 through 14
of this Regulation enumerate the Commission's general investigatory
powers. Article 11 establishes a two-step procedure under which the
Commission may request and obtain information from commercial en-
terprises.7 The Commission must first request the firm to tender the
desired information voluntarily. If the firm does not comply, the Com-
mission may formally demand submission of the requested informa-
tion. Non-compliance may expose the firm to high financial penaltiesY
5 [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2054-55, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 185.
6 The Council of Ministers in 1962, acting pursuant to Article 87 of the E.E.C. Treaty, issued
Regulation 17/62 which provided that the Commission play the major role in the enforcement of
the E.E.C. competition law and policy. Article 9(3) of Regulation 17 limited the responsibility of
the Member States to enforce certain E.E.C. competition rules. Article 9(3) of Regulation 17
states:
As long as the Commission has not initiated any procedure under Articles 2 [negative clear-
ance], 3 [cease and desist order] or 6 [exemption], the authorities of the Member States shall
remain competent to apply Article 85(1) and Article 86 in accordance with Article 88 of the
Treaty ....
Regulation 17/62, 0. J. Eun. Comm. 87 (Spec. Ed. 1959-62) [hereinafter cited as Regulation 17].
See generally B. HAwK, supra note 2, at 415.
7 Article 11(2), (3) and (5) sets forth the two-stage procedure as follows:
(2) When sending a request for information to an undertaking or association of under-
takings, the Commission shall at the same time forward a copy of the request to the compe-
tent authority of the Member State in whose territory the seat of the undertakings or
associations of undertakings is situated.
(3) In its request the Commission shall state the legal basis and the purpose of the re-
quest and also the penalties provided for in Article 15(1)(b) for supplying incorrect informa-
tion.
(5) Where an undertaking or association of undertakings does not supply the informa-
tion requested within the time limit fixed by the Commission, or supplies incomplete infor-
mation, the Commission shall by decision require the information to be supplied. The
decision shall specify what information is required, fix an appropriate time-limit within
which it is to be supplied and indicate the penalties provided for in Article 15(l)(b) and
Article 16(1)(c) and the right to have the decision reviewed by the Court of Justice.
Regulation 17, supra note 6, at art. 11.
8 Article 15(l)(b):
I. The Commission may by decision impose on undertakings or associations of un-
dertakings fines of from 100 to 5000 units of account where, intentionally or negligently:...
(b) They supply incorrect information in response to a request made pursuant to Arti-
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Since an enterprise may deny the initial informal request for informa-
tion, the two-step procedure may be seen as a defacto safeguard, pro-
tecting firms from unnecessary investigations.'
Article 14 empowers the Cbmmission to conduct evidentiary
searches of a firm's premises."0 Under Article 14(1), the Commission is
granted the right of access to a firm's premises, land and vehicles and is
authorized to examine books and other business documents, to make
copies of these documents, and to request on-the-spot verbal explana-
tions. 1 Two procedures for the exercise of these powers are impliedly
provided in Article 14(1) and (2). According to the Commission's es-
cle 11(3), or to Article 12, or do not supply information within the time limit fixed
by a decision taken under Article 11(5);
Article 16(l)(c):
1. The Commission may by decision impose on undertakings or associations of under-
takings periodic penalty payments of from 50 to 1000 units of account per day, calculated
from the date appointed by the decision, in order to compel them:...
(c) to supply complete and correct information which it has requested by decision
taken pursuant to Article 11(5) ...
Regulation 17, supra note 6, at arts. 15, 16.
9 For a discussion of safeguards in the two-step procedure, see text accompanying notes 80-83
,ifra.-
10 Article 14 of Regulation 17/62 states:
1. In carrying out the duties assigned to it by Article 89 and by provisions adopted
under Article 87 of the Treaty, the Commission may undertake all necessary investigations
into undertakings and associations of undertakings. To this end the officials authorised by
the Commission are empowered:
a) to examine the books and other business records;
b) to take copies of or extracts from the books and business records;
c) to ask for oral explanations on the spot;
d) to enter any premises, land and means of transport of undertakings.
2. The officials of the Commission authorised for the purpose of these investigations
shall exercise their powers upon production of an authorisation in writing specifying the sub-
ject matter and purpose of the investigation and the penalties provided for in Article 15(l)(c)
in cases where production of the required books or other business records is incomplete. In
good time before the investigation, the Commission shall inform the competent authority of
the Member State in whose territory the same is to be made of the investigation and of the the
identity of the authorised officials.
3. Undertakings and associations of undertakings shall submit to investigations or-
dered by decision of the Commission. The decision shall specify the subject matter and pur-
pose of the investigation, appoint the date on which it is to begin and indicate the penalties
provided for in Article 15(l)(c) and Article 16(l)(d) and the tight to have the decision re-
viewed by the Court of Justice.
4. The Commission shall take decisions referred to it in paragraph 3 after consultation
with the competent authority of the Member State in whose territory the investigation is to be
made.
5. Officials of the competent authority of the Member State in whose territory the in-
vestigation is to be made may, at the request of such authority or of the Commission, assist
the officials of the Commission in carrying out their duties.
6. Where an undertaking opposes an investigation ordered pursuant to this Article, the
Member State concerned shall afford the necessary assistance to the officials authorised by the
Commission to enable them to make their investigation. Member States shall, after consulta-
tion with the Commission, take the necessary measures to this end before 1 October 1962.
Regulation 17/62, supra note 6, at art. 14.
11 Regulation 17, supra note 6, at art. 14(l)(a)-(d). For the text of Article 14, see note IOsupra.
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tablished practice, as reflected in the Court's opinion in this case, these
sections provide an informal procedure through which the Commission
may request in writing the voluntary submission of desired docu-
ments."2 Under Article 14(3), the Commission may compel a search of
a firm's records by adopting a formal decision. Non-compliance with
an Article 14(3) search warrant may expose a firm to severe economic
penalties.1 3
In National Panasonic, the issue was whether the procedures pro-
vided for in Article 14 must be exercised sequentially as a two-step pro-
cedure, similar to the process under Article 11. The defacto procedural
safeguards inherent in a two-step investigatory procedure are signifi-
cant f6r two reasons. First, there is no private right to appeal a Com-
mission search warrant decision prior to the Article 14(3) search. 4
Second, there is no independent judicial review of the Commission's
search decision upon the warrant's issuance. 1  In National Panasonic,




The Commission reached a formal decision on June 22, 1979, pur-
suant to Article 14(3), to search the business records of National
Panasonic (U.K.), stating that the Commission had obtained documen-
tary evidence and other information that Panasonic was operating an
12 See text accompanying note 33 infra.
13 Article 15(1)(c):
1. The Commission may by decision impose on undertakings or associations of un-
dertakings fines of from 100 to 5000 units of account where, intentionally or negligently:...
(c) they produce the required books or other business records in incomplete form dur-
ing investigations under Article 13 or 14 or refuse to submit to an'investigation
ordered by decision issued in implementation of Article 14(3).
Article 16(l)(d):
I. The Commission may by decision impose on undertakings or associations of under-
takings periodic penalty payments of from 50 to 1000 units of account per day, calculated
from the date appointed by the decision, in order to compel them:...
(d) to submit to an investigation which it has ordered by decision taken pursuant to
Article 14(3).
Regulation 17, supra note 6, at arts. 15, 16.
14 [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2058, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 187-88.
15 Id, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 187-88. In a report by Arved Deringer, a proposal for
independent judicial review was made (§ 121). However, this suggestion was not adopted by the
Parliament. Report in the name of the Internal Commission for Consultation of the European
Parliament by the Council of the European Community, concerning a first implementing regula-
tion to Articles 85 and 86 of the E.E.C. Treaty (Doc. No. 104/1960-01), [1961-62] PARL. EUR.
Doc. (No. 57) (1961). [Hereinafter cited as Deringer Report.]
16 [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2055-56, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 185-86. For the text
of Article 14, see note 10 supra.
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export ban from the U.K. to Germany in violation of Article 85.17 This
decision was unpublished, and Panasonic was not notified of the pro-
ceedings. Following the investigation of June 27, 1979,18 Panasonic ap-
pealed the Commission's action to the European Court of Justice, 19
requesting the return or destruction of all documents obtained in the
investigation and requesting assurances that these documents would
not be used in future proceedings.2"
Panasonic contested the validity of the investigation on four
grounds. First, Panasonic alleged that the Commission violated Article
14 of Regulation 17 by investigating without first requesting voluntary
cooperation. 21 Second, Panasonic claimed that the Commission in-
fringed its fundamental right to privacy and its right to a pre-investiga-
tory review of the decision to search.22 Third, Panasonic claimed that
the Commission violated the principle of proportionality, infringing its
rights beyond the degree necessary for the Commission to perform its
function.23 Finally, Panasonic claimed that the Commission's decision
was based on inadequate reasoning.2 4
17 National Panasonic (U.K.) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a Japanese company, the Mat-
sushita Electrical Industrial Co., Ltd., and is the exclusive distributor in the U.K. of electronic and
electrical goods for Matsushita. A German subsidiary of the Matsushita Group requested a nega-
tive clearance or exemption under Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty relating to an agreement for the
distribution of Panasonic equipment in Germany. This notification did not suggest that the agree-
ment was supported by an export ban. Nevertheless, the Commission suspected that export bans
were being imposed within the Common Market. Id at 2052, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 182.
18 The investigation was conducted by two Commission officials and one official from the
Office of Fair Trading (the U.K. enforcement agency for competition laws). The investigation
lasted approximately seven hours with the Commission officials taking copies of a number of
documents. Id., [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 183.
19 Panasonic appealed pursuant to Article 173 of the EEC Treaty, which states:
The Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts of the Council and the Commission
other than recommendations or opinions. It shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in the
actions brought by a Member State, the Council or the Commission on grounds of lack of
competence, infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or
misuse of powers.
Any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions institute proceedings against
a decision addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the form of a
regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to
the former.
EEC Treaty, supra note 4, at art. 173.
20 [19801 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2051, [19801 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 182.
21 See text accompanying notes 28-33 infra.
22 See text accompanying notes 36-40 infra.
23 See text accompanying notes 46-49 infra.
24 See text accompanying note 50 infra.
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I. OPINION OF THE COURT
A. Interpretation ofArticle 14
National Panasonic maintained that Article 14 required Commis-
sion officials to follow a two-step search procedure, similar in structure
and purpose to Article 11 procedures for obtaining answers to written
questions.25 In support of its interpretation, Panasonic relied on the
legislative history of Regulation 17,26 and the Commission's past prac-
tice in applying Article 14(3), which effectively demonstrated that the
Commission utilized Article 14 as a two-step procedure.' Panasonic
also relied on the language of Article 13(1), which permits the Commis-
sion to call upon the authorities of the member states to undertake "in-
vestigations which [the Commission] considers to be necessary under
Article 14(1) or which the Commission has ordered by decision pursu-
ant to Article 14(3). '"28
Panasonic further claimed that to interpret Article 14 differently
from Article I 1 would grant the Commission investigatory powers sim-
ilar to those available under Article 11, but without the safeguards em-
bodied in the Article 11 two-step process. While Article 14 principally
provides for the procurement of specific documentary records, Article
14(l)(c) does empower the Commission to compel on-the-spot verbal
explanations.29 Such a power arguably could be used to compel firm
25 [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2053, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 183. For the text of
Article 14, see note 10 supra. For the text of Article 11, see note 7 supra.
26 Opinion of Advocate General Warner, id. at 2066, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 177-78.
For a discussion of the legislative history, see text accompanying notes 53-58 infra.
27 The Commission has carried out 24 searches pursuant to Article 14(3) without first giving
prior notice to the enterprise. Answer to Question No. 677/79, submitted by Lady Elles, [1979]
COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 110, 192. Of these, 18 searches were conducted in or about 1979. Pre-
liminary (unofficial) text of National Panasonic decision at 12. The Commission explained that
this increased use of the investigatory power emerged as business intensified the concealment of
these questionable practices as the requirements of Community law became clearer. Opinion of
Advocate General Warner, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2067, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at
178-79.
28 Article 13(1) states:
At the request of the Commission, the competent authorities of the Member States shall
undertake the investigations which the Commission considers to be necessary under Article
14(l), or which it has ordered by decision pursuant to Article 14(3)...
Regulation 17, supra note 6, at art. 13(1) (emphasis added).
Both the applicant and the Commission appear to inconsistently specify the source of the
Commission's procedure for requesting informal searches. In examining the applicant's Article
13(1) argument both parties and the Court recognized Article 14(1) as the source of this procedure.
[1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2055, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 185. In discussing the appli-
cant's contention that failure to recognize a two-step procedure under Article 14 would undermine
the safeguards of Article 11, however, both parties and the Court apparently recognized this infor-
mal power as originating in Article 14(2).
29 For text of Article 14, see note 10 supra.
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employees to answer questions on-the-spot, if properly posed in written
form under Article 11, with the opportunity available under Article 11
of refusing to respond to an initial informal request.3 °
The Court of Justice rejected Panasonic's reliance on legislative
history and instead distinguished Article 14 from Article 11 on statu-
tory grounds, noting that the language of Article 11 expressly provides
for a two-step process, whereas Article 14 includes no such express pre-
liminary condition.3 Furthermore, the Court determined that Articles
11 and 14 established different procedures because the provisions ad-
dress the Commission's different enforcement needs. Article 14 prima-
rily addresses the procurement of specific documentary records and
evidence from the premises of commercial enterprises, presupposing to
some extent the prior possession by the Commission of evidence re-
quiring documentary verification. Article 11, however, envisions com-
mercial enterprises' voluntary preparation of responses to inquiries
from the Commission.32 The Court also dismissed Panasonic's reliance
on the language in Article 13(1), holding that the Article's use of the
word "or" supported an interpretation that the investigatory proce-
dures of Sections 14(1) and 14(3) were alternative methods, not cumu-
lative requirements.33
Finally, the Court rejected Panasonic's claim that the Article 11
guarantee would be circumvented by the Commission's utilization of
Article 14 when demanding oral explanations during searches. The
Court reasoned that the power to request information on specific items
during a search was distinct from the power to request information
pursuant to Article 11. 31 The Court did not explain the distinction be-
tween a request for information pursuant to Article 11, and the request
for an oral explanation pursuant to Article 14(l)(c), except to conclude
that the procedures are not necessarily identical.35
B. Fundamental Rights
Panasonic contested the validity of the search, claiming that it in-
30 See text accompanying note 79 infra.
31 [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2055-56, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 185.
32 Id., [19801 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 185.
33 Id. at 2055, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 185. For the text of Article 13(1), see note 28
.upra.
34 Id., [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 185.
35 Advocate General, Jean-Pierre Warner suggested that the scope of examination under Arti-
cle 14(l)(c) is narrower than an Article 11 request for information in that, under Article 14(1)(c),
the only explanation that can be sought must relate to the "books and records under examination
or their contents." Id. at 2066, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 177.
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fringed its "fundamental rights," specifically its right to privacy and its
right to be heard.36 To demonstrate the origin of a right to privacy,
Panasonic relied on Article 8 of the 1950 European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which
states:3
7
1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise
of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary
in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety
or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others.38
Panasonic maintained that the right to privacy recognized by the Con-
vention applies to legal entities as well as to individuals. Furthermore,
Panasonic argued that "in the absence of clear words relieving' the
Commission from any obligation to give prior notice of an investiga-
tion," Article 14 should be interpreted to lessen the infringement of the
firm's fundamental right to privacy by requiring prior notice.39
The Court did not fully examine the extent, if any, to which a legal
entity has a right to privacy. Instead, it noted that "in so far as it [Arti-
cle 8] applies to legal persons," Article 8(2) of the Human Rights Con-
vention acknowledges that the right of privacy may be infringed by a
public authority.' The Court found that the Commission's investiga-
tive powers under Regulation 17 contributed to the maintenance of a
competitive market system. Without examining the bounds within
36 Panasonic also asserted a "right to prepare for the investigation" and the right to appeal
from the Commission to the Court of Justice and seek a stay from the appeal. The Court did not
address the right to prepare for an investigation. Regarding the right to a stay from the appeal,
the Court maintained that an Article 185 request for a stay presupposes that a decision be made.
In this case, National Panasonic wanted the right to appeal to the Court of Justice on the basis of
an informal request (Article 14(l)) prior to a formal decision by the Commission. Id. at 2058,
[1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 187-88.
37 Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. The European Court of Justice in Nold, Kohlen undBaus-
toffgrosshandlung v. European Commission, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 491, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 338, held that the Court will ensure that fundamental rights, an integral part of the general
principles of law, will be applied. Furthermore, in safeguarding these rights, the Court stated that
it would look to the constitutional traditions of the member states and the international treaties
protecting human rights signed by the member states, such as the European Human Rights Con-
vention. Id. at 501, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 351.
38 213 U.N.T.S. 221, at art. 8. For a discussion of the right to privacy regarding legal entities,
see text accompanying notes 59-70 supra.
39 Opinion of Advocate General Warner, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2067, [1980] 3
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 179.
40 Id. at 2057, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 186. For complete text of Article 8, see text
accompanying note 37 supra.
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which the exercise of such powers "is necessary" and thus proper, the
Court concluded that the Commission's power to conduct an on-the-
spot search under Article 14 did not infringe Panasonic's right of
privacy.4
1
Panasonic also asserted that it was denied the right to a hearing
prior to an administrative agency's adverse decision.42 Supporting
Panasonic's claim is a general administrative rule requiring an agency
to provide a party whose interests may be adversely affected with an
opportunity to be heard prior to the agency's decision.43
The Court rejected this claim, stating that the right to a hearing
provided in Article 19 of Regulation 17 is applicable only when the
administrative agency declares that an agreement or other business
practice is incompatible with the antitrust laws.' The Court held that
a search under Article 14 does not infringe upon or constitute an ad-
verse decision to a firm, because the sole objective of the search is to
gather information. A firm's right to be heard must be recognized only
if the information collected leads to the initiation of a proceeding to
determine whether a business practice is incompatible with Article 85.
C Principle of Proportionality and Specqici y Requirements
In proceeding immediately by means of an on-the-spot search
rather than by first requesting the documents informally, Panasonic as-
serted that the Commission violated the principle of proportionality.
As established in the case law of the European Court, this principle
mandates that administrative agencies refrain from infringing an indi-
vidual's freedoms beyond the degree necessary to perform governmen-
tal functions. 6 Panasonic asserted that a decision to investigate
without prior notification and review is justified only if "the situation is
very grave and where there is the greatest urgency and need for com-
41 Id. at 2057, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 187.
42 Id., [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 187.
43 Article 19 of Regulation 17 provides for the hearings of parties before the Commission acts
on a competition matter in Articles 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 15 and 16. Articles 11 and 14 are excluded from
the requirements of Article 19. Regulation 17, supra note 6, at art. 19.
44 [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2058, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 187.
45 Id., [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 187. Regulation 99/63 implements Article 19. See note
43 supra.
46 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfthr- und Vorratsstelle Fur Getreide und
Ftittermittel, [1970] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1125, 1136, [1972] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 225, 285.
In fact, the fundamental right invoked here-that the individual should not have his freedom
of action limited beyond the degree necessary for the general interest-is already guaranteed
both by the general principle of Community law, the principle of proportionality, the compli-
ance with which is ensured by the Court and by an express provision of the Treaty!
Opinion of Advocate General Dutheillet De Lamothe, id. at 1147, [1972] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 271.
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plete secrecy."' 47 Therefore, the Commission's written decision to in-
vestigate violated this principle by not incorporating in its statement of
reasons that an emergency in fact existed.48 The Court rejected this
contention, holding that the Commission's choice between an informal
request for documents and an unannounced search depended "on the
need for an appropriate inquiry," and not upon a demonstration by the
Commission of a special emergency.
49
Finally, Panasonic contested the Commission's decision to investi-
gate pursuant to Article 14(3), claiming that the Commission's decision
failed to specify the reasons for selecting an Article 14 investigation
without first conducting an informal inquiry. The Court of Justice dis-
missed this contention as well, noting that the Commission satisfied the
elements of the statement required in Article 14(3) by specifying the
subject matter, the purpose and date of the investigation, the penalties
for non-compliance and the right to have the decision reviewed by the
Court of Justice."
II. DisCUSSION
Unlike Article 11, Article 14 does not contain an express provision
requiring the Commission to initiate investigations by requesting vol-
untary submission of desired documents before mandating such sub-
missions by a formal decision. The Court held that, in the absence of a
clear and express provision, the Article 14(2) and 14(3) procedures were
alternative means for conducting an investigation." Since it was inter-
preting an ambiguous statute, the Court should have examined both
the drafters' intent, as ascertainable from the legislative history, and
other legal principles within the Common Market. Such an examina-
tion suggests that the Court's decision is at variance with both of these
factors. The legislative history supports a two-stage procedure. Fur:
thermore, fundamental principles and rights recognized in the laws of
the Common Market Member States support an interpretation requir-
ing a two-step procedure.52
The plain language of the statute is not dispositive as to whether a
two-step procedure is required. Arved Deringer, one of the principal
drafters of Regulation 17 stated a number of years after the proposal
47 [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2059-60, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 188.
48 Id., [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 188.
49 Id. at 2060, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 189.
50 Id. at 2059, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 188. For the text of Article 14, see note 10 supra.
51 Id. at 2055, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 185. See text accompanying notes 31-32 supra.
52 EEC Treaty, supra note 4, at art. 164.
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was passed that "it is impossible to conclude either from the Treaty or
from the text of the regulation that there is any difference in rank, that
is, that the right to investigate is secondary to the right to request infor-
mation."53 The drafters of Regulation 17, however, and officials of the
Commission at the time the proposals were passed envisioned Article
14 as establishing a two-step procedure.5 4 The Report of the European
Parliament's Internal Market Committee (the Deringer Report), ulti-
mately adopted as Regulation 17, stated that the procedures for Article
11 and Article 14 were similar, thus implying an obligatory two-step
procedure.
These two articles [Articles 11 and 14, which were then 9 and 11, respec-
tively] distinguish two stages: in the first stage, the enterprises or associa-
tions of enterprises can elect whether to answer a simple request for
information or for an investigation from the Commission; if they do an-
swer they are required to give complete and accurate information. If the
enterprises, or associations of enterprises do not give that information, the
Commission demands the information of the second stage through a for-.55
mal decision, which can be appealed to the Court of Justice.
The drafters of Article 14, including Arved Deringer, envisioned
both Article 11 and Article 14 as two-step procedures. Dr. Hans von
der Groeben, a member of the Commission for competition policy,
stated in a speech before the European Parliament on October 19, 1961:
We must distinguish between two things: on one hand information, on
the other, verification. We have foreseen two stages: first the stage of
voluntary declarations; as to this regard one should hardly have objec-
tions. In the event the party in question does not voluntarily furnish the
information or does not voluntarily submit to a verification, the Commis-
sion must under the terms of our recommendation render a formal moti-
vated decision. This [formal] decision must be appealable before the
Court of Justice having full competence to proceed with a verification.
Besides, the possibility has been foreseen that the Commission not render
53 A. DERINGER, THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 333
(1968), [1968] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) % 2251.
54 See Deringer Report, supra note 15, at 30, 120-22. The Deringer Report was the proposal
that ultimately became Regulation 17, note 6 supra. In the Deringer Report, Articles 11 and 14 of
Regulation 17 were then known as Articles 9 and 11, respectively.
55 Unofficial translation. The original French text is as follows:
£ 'article 9 donne &t Ia Commission pour remplir sa tche certains droits d'information tk lgard
des gouvernements et des autoritks responsables des Eta/s membres et a l'gard des entreprises et
des associations d'entreprises. L'article 11 rogle lespouvoirs de viriflcation de la Commission.
Les deuxprescriptions distinguent deux stades: aupremier stade, les entreprises ou les associa-
tions d'entreprisespeuvent rpondre ou non 42 la simple demande de renseignements ou de vbrY-
cation de la Commission; si elles repondent, elles sont tenues defournir des renseignements
complets et exacts. Si les entreprises et les associations dentreprises ne donnent pas ces ren-
seignements, la Commission exige les renseignements du second stadepar une dfcisionformelle,
susceptible de recours devant la Cour dejustice.
Deringer Report, supra note 15, at 30, 120.
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a decision in cases where this decision would carry with it serious dangers
for the enterprise.
56
Thus, when the recommendation for Article 14 was formed, both draft-
ers and Commission officials envisioned a two-step procedure.
Subsequent reaction to Article 14 supports this view. Dr. W.
Schlieder, then Commission Director General for Competition, ex-
plained in an article published after the adoption of Regulation 17 that
the Commission would follow a two-step procedure in the implementa-
tion of Article 14.17 Several other commentators viewed the Article 14
procedures as similar to the procedures in Article 11, requiring the
Commission to first request voluntary cooperation. 8
In addition to consulting the legislative intent of the drafters, the
Court of Justice should have made a determination as to which con-
struction of Article 14 was most consistent with the fundamental rights
and principles reflected in the laws of the Member States and the
Court's prior decisions. Two fundamental rights in particular were at
issue in National Panasonic: the right to privacy and the right to be
heard prior to a search.
A. Right to Privacy
The right to privacy, guaranteed by the European Convention on
Human Rights, has been incorporated into Community law.59 At issue
is the extent, if any, to which the right to privacy guaranteed under
Article 8 of the Convention applies to legal persons.6' The Article rec-
ognizes three spheres of privacy, namely, respect for an individual's
56 Unofficial translation. The original French text is as follows:
Nous devons distinguer entre deux chosesa dune part, les renseignements et, d'autre part, la
vYrfcation. Nous avonspr,vu deux stades: d'abord le stade de la delaration sponten e; ft ce
propos, ilne dolt gunrey avoir d'objection. Au cas ozt li'ntresso nefournirai/pas spontan'ment
le renseignement ou s'ii ne se soumettait pas sponten~ment a une vtr'ftcafion, la Commission
devra, aux termes de notreprojet, rendre une dacision motivee. Cette dreision doitpouvoirfaire
i'objet d'une recours dean/ la Cour dejuslice laquelle apleinement compktencepourprocder f
la v~rfcatiom En outre, on aprvu lapossibiiit que la Commission neprennepas de deision
au cas ofit ce/e d~cision entrainerait de srieux dangerspour Pentreprise.
[1961-1962] EUR. PARL. DEB. 233 (Oct. 19, 1961).
57 Schlieder, Die Anwendung der Artikel 85 und'86 des EWG- ertrages nach dem Erlass der
ersten Durchfthrungsverordnung, BETRIEBS-BERATER 305, 311 (1962).
58 C. OBERDORFER, A. GLmSS & M. HmscH, COMMON MNARKE CARTEL LAW 148 (1963),
[1963] CoMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 443, stating that "[]ike the procedure for obtaining informa-
tion (See Article 11... ), that governing inspections [Article 14] and examination has two stages."
See also, V. KoRAH, EEC CoMpETmoN LAW AND PRAcrICE 31 (1978).
59 NoId, Kohlen und Baustoffgrosshandlung v. Commission of the European Communities,
[1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 501, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 351.
60 The European Commission of Human Rights has held that legal persons are incapable of
exercising the right of freedom of thought and conscience (Article 9(1) of the Human Rights Con-
vention) and the right to education (Article 2 of the First Protocol). PRIVACY AND HUMAN
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family life, his home and his correspondence.61 Whether a corporate
entity has a right to respect for its private life is a question beyond the
scope of this note.62 The Court of Justice in Acciaieria e Tubfcio di
Brescia v. High Authority of the ECSC, however, has extended the right
of privacy to business premises.63  Thus, the guarantee of respect for
the privacy of the home has been extended to include a business prem-
ise.64 Although the Court has yet to directly recognize a right of pri-
vacy regarding business correspondence, such an extension to legal
persons should follow by implication. 5
The right to privacy guaranteed in Article 8 of the Human Rights
Convention, however, is not absolute. Section 2 of that Article outlines
the limited conditions under which the right may be infringed. The
Article provides that this right should be infringed only "in accordance
with the law" and then only "as. . . is necessary in a democratic soci-
ety. ''66 Individuals and legal entities are therefore protected from un-
necessary invasions of their right to privacy.
In examining the Commission's justification for allegedly infring-
ing the privacy right, the Court in National Panasonic noted that the
preamble to Regulation 17 vested the Commission with the task of en-
forcing the competition laws.67 Specifically, the Court relied on Pream-
ble 8, which permits the Commission "to undertake such investigations
RIGHTS, COLLECTION OF DECISIONs No. 29 at 70 (Commission Application 3798/68) (Dec. 17,
1968) (A. Robertson ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Robertson].
61 See text accompanying note 37 supra.
62 For the assertion that a legal entity does have a right to private life, see Robertson, note 60
supra. In the U.S., the Supreme Court has held that the right to respect for private life does not
apply to a corporation. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).
63 [1960] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 71, 80. In Acciaieria the Court of Justice was interpreting
Article 86(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) which
empowers the High Authority (which has since been merged into the Commission) to carry out
checks of businesses. The Court recognized that there was a right of privacy regarding the busi-
ness premises. The Court gave the High Authority all the rights and powers to make direct checks
that are at the disposal of the national tax authorities.
64 According to Robertson, the legal definition of the term home "is applied to any building,
whatever its purpose, together with its curtilage, whether built on or not, access to which is re-
stricted to the persons having the right to exclusive occupation and to persons whom they have
authorised to enter or establish themselves there." Robertson, supra note 60, at 19.
65 Robertson concludes that a legal entity has a right to respect for correspondence. Robert-
son, supra note 60, at 20.
66 See text accompanying note 37 supra. This guarantee would seem comparable to the U.S.
4th Amendment guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
67 Regulation 17, supra note 6, at Preamble 7 and 8.
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as are necessary. ' 68 Since the Commission may perform any "neces-
sary" investigations to enforce the competition law, and since Article
8(2) permits "necessary" infringements, the Court concluded that a
search without previous notification would not violate Article 8(2).69
The Court's analysis is questionable on several grounds. Article
8(2), while recognizing the power of public authorities to infringe upon
the right of privacy, also limits the exercise of that power. Article 8(2)
could be interpreted to require an independent determination by the
Court regarding whether the Regulation 17 grant of investigatory pow-
ers to the Commission was "necessary,"' and whether the particular ex-
ercise of such powers in Nalional Panasonic was "necessary" on the
facts of the case. The Court failed to examine the validity under Arti-
cle 8(2) of the European Parliament's creation and delegation of inves-
tigatory powers in Regulation 17. Even if the Court were correct in
deferring to the Parliament in this determination, it is not clear that the
delegation of powers to the Commission includes in Article 14 the
power to conduct searches without prior notification.70 The available
legislative history suggests that the Commission does not have the
power to conduct searches without prior notice to the firm.7 1
Even if the power to conduct searches without prior notice has
been delegated to the Commission, it is not clear that the actual full
exercise of this power automatically renders it "necessary" and thus
proper. Therefore, while the Commission may have been justified in
searching Panasonic's business records, the Court should have inquired
whether the facts of the case required prior notification and an oppor-
tunity for a hearing prior to such search. Preamble 8 and Article 14, in
expressly authorizing only "necessary" investigations, indicate that the
Commission's power to investigate and its discretion to determine what
is "necessary" are not absolute.72 In failing to examine the extent to
68 Preamble 8:
Whereas for this purpose the Commission must have the cooperation of the competent
authorities of the Member States and be empowered, throughout the common market, to
require such information to be supplied and to undertake such investigations as are necessary
tobring to light any agreement, decision or concerted practice prohibited by Article 85(1) or
any abuse of a dominant position prohibited by Article 86.
Regulation 17, supra note 6, at Preamble 8.
69 [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2057, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 187.
70 This assumes that all parliamentary acts are valid under Article 8(2) of the Convention.
71 For a discussion of the legislative history, see text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
72 Article 14(1) states: "[t]he Commission may conduct all necessary investigations... ..
Regulation 17, .supra note 6, at art. 14(1). Thus the Commission is presently limited by a require-
ment that the investigation be "necessary" in order to accomplish their tasks. No definition of a
"necessary" investigation has emerged from the case law of the Court of Justice. A. DERiNGER,
THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN EcoNoMIc CoMMUNITY, supra note 53, at 334,
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which a legal entity's right to privacy may be infringed, the Court ne-
glected to address an admittedly difficult and significant issue in the
case.
B. Right to be Heard
Embodied within the national laws of the Member States73 is the
principle that a person has a right to be heard prior to an administra-
tive action detrimental to his interests "even if the statute does not ex-
pressly require it."'74 This principle was recognized by the Court in
Transocean Marine Paint Association v. Commission.7 In this case, the
Commission claimed that it was under no duty to provide a hearing to
an applicant filing for renewal of an Article 85(3) exemption, under
circumstances where the Commission had imposed a new condition on
exemption renewal.76 This added condition would have required the
applicant to file prospective reports with the Commission.7" The Com-
mission claimed authority for the change from the fact that it could
2252, suggested that since the right to investigate was a greater infringement into the individual
sphere than a request for information, a stricter standard of what was necessary should be applied
in the case of an investigation. This same principle would apply to the question of whether an
investigation without prior notice is necessary.
Additionally, the Court's reasoning ignores the requirement in Article 8(a) of the European
Human Rights Convention which states that the infringement of the right to privacy must be in
"accordance with the law ... in a democratic society." 213 U.N.T.S. 221, at art. 8(a). The Court
should have construed the Article 14 investigatory power in accordance with general principles of
law within the Member States. Specifically, the Court should have examined the right to a pre-
investigatory hearing.
73 Transocean Marine Paint Association v. Commission of the European Communities, Opin-
ion of Advocate General Warner, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1063, 1088, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 459, 469.
74 Thus the right to a hearing prior to an administrative decision was recognized in England,
Scotland, Ireland, Denmark, Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg and questionably in France. Opin-
ion of Advocate General Warner, id. at 1088-89, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 470-71.
75 Id., [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 470-71. In Transocean Marine, the Commission had
previously granted to the association an Article 85(3) exemption. The association applied for a
renewal of the exemption for a ten year period. Following hearings on the renewal request, the
Commission ruled that, because of changing economic circumstances, stricter conditions would be
applied to the request. Transocean claimed that it was denied the right to a hearing on this addi-
tional condition. Furthermore, Transocean claimed that the additional condition imposed on it a
duty to provide certain information to the Commission, prior to the receipt of any requests for
information from the Commission under Article 11. The Court held that there was a general rule
requiring that persons whose interests are perceptibly affected by a decision be given the opportu-
nity to make their point of view known. Id. at 1080, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 477. Thus, the
Commission should have given Transocean a hearing prior to the imposition of the additional
condition. Id. at 1081, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 478. Transocean had argued that the Com-
mission could not satisfy its informational needs by imposing ongoing reporting requirements
obviating the need for Article 11 informal requests. Id. at 1070.
76 See note 75 supra.
77 Arguments of the parties, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1070.
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have compelled submission of the desired information at a future date
under Article 11, which expressly provides for a formal hearing.78 Ad-
vocate General Warner, in addressing the Commission's interpretation
of Article 11, contended that even though Article 11 did not include an
explicit right to notice and hearing, the existence of a two-step proce-
dure arguably indicated the drafters' intention to protect this right. As
he asked:
What possible purpose can this two-stage procedure serve, unless it be to
afford an opportunity for any observations of the "undertaking or associ-
ation of undertakings" concerned, as well as of the competent authorities
of the relevant Member State or Member States, to be made and consid-
ered before the Commission reaches a final decision [to investigate]? 79
The request for voluntary submission of information presents the sub-
ject firm with an opportunity to either submit additional information or
its reasons for non-compliance prior to the Commission's formal de-
mand for the information. The Court in Transocean Marine supported
Warner's interpretation, thereby recognizing a general right to be heard
prior to administrative action. 0
In National Panasonic, the Court found that the Commission's de-
cision to search did not detrimentally affect Panasonic's interests. The
Court distinguished between a decision to terminate an agreement or
practice as incompatible with Article 85 and a decision to search, con-
cluding that until a substantive decision to terminate an agreement or
practice is at issue, there is no right to a hearing.8' This conclusion
directly contradicts the Court's holding in Transocean Marine, and fur-
thermore, is inconsistent with generally accepted principles of law
within the Member States. 2
The Court's holding in National Panasonic presupposes that a
post-investigative appeal is sufficient to remedy any damage suffered
through the infringement of fundamental rights. The intangible nature
of liberty and privacy rights, however, renders the efficacy of post-in-
vestigative review illusory. An appeal after an improper search cannot
adequately remedy the injury already suffered.83
In addition, a subsequent appeal cannot afford adequate safe-
guards against administrative harassment. Not only is the right to pri-
vacy abridged when an improper search occurs, but also at stake is the
78 Id.
79 Opinion of Advocate General Warner, id. at 1090, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 472.
80 Id. at 1080, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 477.
81 See text accompanying notes 42-45 supra.
82 See text accompanying notes 66-75 su.pra.
83 See Deringer Report supra note 15, at 30, 121.
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possible public exposure of privileged trade secrets and other important
proprietary information.84 After National Panasonic, there is no re-
quirement of prior notice, no right to prior appeal, nor any independ-
ent check on the Commission's discretion to conduct on-the-spot
searches, thus increasing the potential for "fishing expeditions" on
scantily based suspicions to find alleged antitrust violations.
In practice, the Commission has followed a two-step procedure.
Only since 1978 has the Commission increasingly utilized the proce-
dure in Article 14(3) without first requesting voluntary compliance.
The Commission has justified its increasing use of Article 14(3) by not-
ing that businesses, now more aware of the specific prohibitions of the
antitrust laws, are attempting to conceal questionable practices.86 The
Commission maintains that on-the-spot searches are necessary to en-
force antitrust policies, and therefore justify serious infringement of the
right to privacy.87 A two-step procedure renders it impossible to con-
duct surprise investigations, therefore granting company management
84 There are presently no provisions to guarantee professional secrets under Article I 1 and 14.
Article 14(a) permits the Commission to investigate and copy "books and other business records."
Recommendations in the Deringer Report, note 15 supra, which suggested that any person re-
quired to supply information should have the right to refuse to testify regarding professional
secrets, were not adopted. COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST 143 (J. Rahl ed. 1970).
In4AMandSEurope Limited v. Commission, Case 155/79, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 304) 1
(1979) (yet to be decided by the European Court), an English company has challenged the Com-
mission's right to determine if a given document should be protected on the grounds of profes-
sional privacy. The Commission has stated that it will not use evidence of "any strictly legal
papers written with a view to seeking or giving opinions on points of law . . . or relating to
preparation of the defence" but that it was for the Commission to determine the nature of a
document. Commission's Answer of June 2, 1978 to Written Question No. 63/78 by Mr. Couste,
21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 188) 30-31 (1978).
In AM and S Europe, the Commission carried out an investigation on the applicant's prem-
ises for alleged breaches of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, note 4 supra. The Commission re-
quested further documents following the search, but the firm refused to comply in full, believing
some of the requested documents to be legally privileged. The Commission did not accept the
claim of professional privilege and made a formal decision demanding the documents. 22 O..
EUR. COMM. (No. L 199) 31 (1979), [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 376. AM and S Europe appealed
the Commission's decision to the Court of Justice. [1980] 1 EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 346.
Advocate General J.P. Warner has taken the position that there is a recognized right of privilege
regarding documents passing between lawyer and client. According to Warner, the allocation of
the power of inspection to a Commission official could prejudice the rights of a party claiming the
privilege. The Advocate General recommended that national courts determine if the contents of
the requested documents ought to be privileged. The national courts, he maintained, could apply
the relevant Community law and, if in doubt, refer the matter to the Court of Justice pursuant to
Article 177 of the EEC Treaty, note 4 supra. Whether the Court of Justice will adopt Advocate
General Warner's proposal remains to be seen. [1981] 2 EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 27.
85 See note 27 supra.
86 Opinion of Advocate General Warner, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2067, [1980] 3
Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 178.
87 Id at 2068, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 180.
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the opportunity to remove, destroy or alter documents. 88 This change
in the enforcement environment does not, however, justify judicial rec-
ognition of a broader investigatory power than is granted in Article 14.
The legislative history suggests that the drafters provided a two-stage
procedure.89 This is consistent with the Court's prior recognition of the
right to privacy90 and the right to be heard. 9' The determination that
the Commission must have the power to perform surprise searches in
order to effectively enforce the antitrust laws should be left to the Com-
munity's legislative authorities.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
The European Economic Community's legislative authorities
should seek to provide the European Commission with effective means
to enforce the Community's antitrust laws, while at the same time pro-
tecting firms from unnecessary official invasion of their fundamental
rights. The two-step procedure arguably provided by Article 14, and
previously practiced by the Commission, no longer adequately satisfies
both goals. The Commission's increasing departure from the utiliza-
tion of a two-step procedure underscores the lack of any formal process
to effectively guard against potential administrative abuse. Under the
two-step procedure, the only pre-investigatory check against the Com-
mission's discretion is a party's non-compliance with an initial informal
request for information. The Court in National Panasonic removed
this safeguard, allowing the Commission to by-pass the first step of the
two-step procedure, without offering any other safeguard in its place.
Although the two-step procedure alone may be inadequate to meet
the Commission's current investigatory needs, other solutions are avail-
able. Independent exparte review by a judicial magistrate of the rea-
sons for issuance of a search warrant would provide the Commission
the secrecy it desires, yet would also serve to guard against unnecessary
searches.92 The Deringer Report recommended that independent judi-
88 Id, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 180.
89 See text accompanying notes 54-58 supra.
90 See text accompanying notes 59-66 supra.
91 See text accompanying notes 74-80 supra.
92 Deringer Report, supra note 15, at 30, 121. The Court of Justice is the only judical branch
in the EEC. Thus, independent judical review would have to be provided in the national courts of
the Member States. The judical authorities would be required to interpret Community law and
thus meet the specificity requirements as laid down in Article 14(3) of Regulation 17. EEC Treaty,
supra note 4, at art. 5. The Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction to review national court
decisions, EEC Treaty, supra note 4, at art. 177, it only has jurisdiction to render a ruling on
Community law after the national court requests a preliminary decision. The legislators may
deem it necessary to establish a lower court, or judicial system to authorize these search warrants.
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cial review of the search warrant be required in addition to the two-step
procedure.93 The Report expressly points out that the German Consti-
tution requires that a search warrant be authorized by a judge.9 4 A
number of other Member States also require search warrants to be is-
sued by a judicial magistrate." If neither the two-step procedure nor
independent judicial review of a Commission search warrant is fol-
lowed, then the constitutional safeguards established within the Mem-
ber State are being violated by present Commission procedure.
To mandate independent judicial review in addition to requiring
the Commission to follow a two-step procedure, however, would de-
prive the Commission of the secrecy and surprise of unannounced
searches which, on occasion, it may justifiably need. For those special
occasions, the Commission should have discretion to conduct a surprise
search, reviewable by an independent judicial authority. The Commis-
sion should be required to present before the judical magistrate its rea-
sons for the search, as well as its grounds for the surprise.9 6 Since an ex
parte search warrant proceeding would deprive the subject firm of its
right to be heard before the search, the Commission should be held to a
strong burden of proof in establishing that a surprise search is "neces-
sary" under the circumstances. The two-step procedure should still be
utilized in all other investigations, with the added requirement of in-
dependent judical review upon the issuance of a formal search warrant
decision.
The Court's decision in National Panasonic calls for, at a mini-
mum, a reassertion of the sequential two-step procedure in Article 14
The Commission would then not be subject to the national court and an appeal of the magistrate's
decision could be made directly to the Court of Justice. But a complete examination of the means
to provide for independent judicial review is beyond the scope of this article.
93 In the case of searches, one should provide the intervention of a judical authority be-
cause, for example, under the Geiman constitutional law, searches cannot be conducted ex-
cept under a search warrant of a judge. The possibility for the concerned party to introduce
an appeal before the Court of Justice against the decision of the Commission doesn't replace
the search warrant of a judge because of the reversal of the burden of the petition restricts
inadmissibly the protection of the party concerned. Unofficial translation. The original
French text is as follows:
En cas de perquisition, ilfaut prbvoir Iiintervention du tribunal du fait que d'aprbs la loi
fondamentale allemande, par exemple, des perquisitions ne peuvent 0tre faites que sur
mandat dujuge. La possibilitb pour l'intress dintroduire un recours devant la Cour de
justice contre la dkcision de la Commission ne remplacepas le mandat deperquesition du
juge, car le renversement de la charge de la demande restreint d'unefafon inadmissible la
dfense de lintkressb.
Deringer Report, supra note 15, at 30, 121.
94 Id
95 A search warrant must be authorized by a judical magistrate in Belgium, Germany, France
and the Netherlands. See generally G. MUELLER & F. LE POOLE-GRIFFITHS, COMPARATIVE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 19 (1962); Robertson, supra note 60, at 20.
96 For a discussion of Deringer's standards for "necessary" investigations, see note 72 supra.
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by the Community's legislative authorities. Although this solution does
not provide the needed formal independent check on Commission deci-
sions, it lessens possible infringements on a firm's fundamental rights.
Enactment of an additional procedure for ex parte judical, review of
Commission search warrant decisions would not only provide the de-
sired additional safeguard against potential abuse of administrative
discretion, but could also be modified to allow unannounced 14(3)
searches on occasions when surprise is deemed necessary in order to
ensure the preservation of desired documentary evidence.
CONCLUSION
The European Court of Justice in National Panasonic v. Commis-
sion interpreted Article 14 so as to empower the Commission to con-
duct on-the-spot investigations of businesses suspected of violating the
Community's antitrust laws. A firm's only recourse after this decision
is an appeal to the Court of Justice after the search. The Court rejected
Panasonic's comparison of the investigatory procedures in Article 14
with the two-step requirement in the Article 11 power to request infor-
mation. Article 11 requires the Commission to seek voluntary assist-
ance from the firm before making a formal decision compelling the
production of information. The Court interpreted Article 14 to provide
alternative methods of investigation-a voluntary request and an on-
the-spot investigation. Discretionary authority as to the choice of
methods ultimately rests with the Commission.
The National Panasonic decision subjects firms operating in the
Common Market to potentially severe invasions of privacy and poten-
tial administrative harassment. Since a formal decision by the Com-
mission to search a firm can only be appealed after the search, firms
may be subjected to "fishing expeditions" to discover alleged antitrust
violations. Not only are these searches potentially disruptive of the
normal conduct of business and an infringement on the right to pri-
vacy, there is also the risk of public exposure of important trade secrets
and other proprietary information. The potential for administrative
abuse is exacerbated by the absence of any independent judicial review
of Commission decisions to search a firm's records pursuant to Article
14(3).
In light of National Panasonic, the European Economic Commu-
nity's legislative authorities should reconsider the procedures estab-
lished by Regulation 17 empowering the Commission to conduct on-
the-spot investigations. The legislators should reassert a two-stage pro-
cedure in Article 14, or consider providing an independent review of
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warrants to investigate firms, as either an alternative or additional
safeguard.
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